Few people have monopolized the imagination of a people and faded so quickly from memory, as has Gen Raheel Sharif. The reason for this seems to be that he was more a creation of skillful portrayal by the DG ISPR, Gen Asim Salim Bajwa, as somebody in whom the hopes of the nation ought to be infused, than the reality of the man could justify. These hopes pictured Raheel Sharif as a redeemer of their lot. They were looking to Raheel to retrieve them from the clutches of the ruling mafia which had destroyed their lives, and promised a vision of hell for their children.
But the redemption did not take place. Towards the end of his career credible information began to filter down that on more issues than met the eye, he was in cahoots with Nawaz Sharif and company.
In recent days a new effort seems underway to inflate his limp sails with a fresh gust of wind to install him on the pedestal in national memory from which he has recently been toppled off.
The central prop being used in this effort to refurbish his image is his comparison with Gen Kiyani. The tactic seems to be to denigrate Kiyani and blacken him, so that against this foil, the image of Raheel Sharif will stand out shining and resplendent.
But for those who are orchestrating this revival there is bad news. Raheel will not come out shining when a dispassionate comparison is made between him and his predecessor.
Kiyani probably did more for this army than any single individual, as well as most army chiefs put together. And these achievements cannot be merely wished away.
He was the first and only Chief to have made substantial improvements in the lives and emoluments of Other Ranks. Not even his worst detractor will deny him this.
He enhanced the pay and allowances of all ranks to a level where they could realistically live decent lives, and when fighting the deadliest war in our history, not be worried about their families, and what may happen to them, should they give their lives in the process.
His contributions to the training of the army, its war doctrine, and the strategy crafted for the war on terrorism were signal achievements.
He made this a paperless army thus shedding from the daily routine of correspondence a huge amount of dead weight.
He dug out the buried subject of Frontier Warfare, dusted it, and amended it suitably to meet the requirements of today. And using the amended doctrine and tactics, led a hugely successful operation in Swat to take the valley from the clutches of the militants.
And most notably, of the 48000 sq km of the zone of conflict, during his leadership, 35000 sq km were secured and pacified. Only N. Waziristan was left to be dealt with when the appropriate resources and political climate allowed it.
He made a huge improvement to exams within the army, and entry tests for Staff College etc, to help the rise of merit within the ranks of the army.
No Army Chief did more for the rehabilitation and treatment of the wounded and the injured during this war, by building the finest state of the art hospital and medical infrastructure in Rawalpindi.
No other Chief did more for the families of the martyrs, their welfare, and their security than Kiyani.
All this about Kiyani has been forgotten. He is paying the price for what his brothers did in his shadow. Whether he was willfully providing cover for them or not, cannot be a moot issue. It needs to be acknowledged that the taint of corruption which has attached itself to his name is so compelling and well merited that nothing can rub it off. And neither can his services to Asif Ali Zardari be forgotten to whom he lent the full support of the army. Sadly this became a tale of one thief supporting another.
Yet nothing can take away the fact of his many services to the Army. On balance therefore, he can be said to have rebuilt the form of the army but ruined its spirit and soul.
So, the cohorts dedicated to improving Raheel Sharif’s sunk image are advised not to do so by denigrating Kiyani, who sinks under the weight of his own considerable demerits. They should try and burnish Raheel’s image on its own merit.
And to be certain, Raheel did have some merit. He was a quintessential gentleman. There was no odour of personal corruption about him. He had the natural flair of a commander who could make his fighting men feel at ease in his presence. And he did indeed do a lot for the morale of his army by making certain that he spent his Eids among the men in the furthest trenches, and never let go an opportunity to be with them.
But there were also his failures. And there were many.
His initiation of Zarb e Azab was his one great success. But what is not quite well known is that his was not the prime motivation behind this operation. He had some very good and dedicated Generals who propelled him into taking immediate and decisive action in this direction.
Probably no other officer did more to defeat the militants than Lt Gen Tariq Khan. And no officer did more to convince his colleagues that a final operation to rid Pakistan of the militants should be launched in N. Waziristan; that it can be won; and that given the right commitment and strategy, it will be won.
When Gen Tariq retired, Lt Gen Asfaq Nadeem then CGS and considered to be the most competent senior officer of the day, became primarily responsible for Zarb e Azab, ably supported by [then] Maj Gen Amir Riaz These two became the prime guiding lights and propellers of this operation. But ISPR ensured that it was Raheel who got all the credit for it. And he gladly lapped it up.
But very soon Raheel moved Ashfaq Nadeem out of GHQ. No one quite understood why this was done. Eventually the growing consensus came to be that it was Ashfaq who stood between Nawaz Sharif’s commitment to the Saudis to send Pak Army troops to fight in Yemen, and the fulfillment of this commitment. This was a great embarrassment to Nawaz Sharif. The move of Ashfaq Nadeem from GHQ to Multan brought about the first suspicion that Raheel Sharif was taking dictation from N.S on purely professional issues, and was not the stolid professional that ISPR was making him out to be.
Next, Raheel ensured that the FIR in the Model Town massacre was registered on the complaint of Maulana Qadri etc but failed to carry out his commitment to Qadri to the promised end. This broke the back of the Dharna because Qadri announced his withdrawal from it, and gave Nawaz breathing room. But had this FIR reached its logical conclusion, it would have meant the end of NS and family. So Raheel’s intervention came to be seen as a bail out of NS, and the suspicion that he was playing a double game, became all the stronger. With the junior officers Raheel began losing his shine when he failed to move Ranger operations into Sindh interior where all the worst militants were taking refuge; and he never even tried to flush out terrorists from the Punjab, when it was widely known that the government of this province had electoral alliances with militant groups and was sponsoring and using some of them. Among his command, Raheel’s star began going into serious decline because of the suspicions aroused by his hesitations to move on these two fronts.
And then came Dawn leaks and rumours that Raheel had bailed out Nawaz Sharif against a promise of either being promoted Field Marshal or getting a three year extension as Army Chief. These rumours did most to tarnish his star. And Gen Bajwa was left to take a hit to his credibility when junior officers began questioning him about why the army was not exposing the reality of Dawn leaks, and letting the culprits go scott free when they should have been tried by a court martial under the official secrets act. Bajwa was indeed too much of a gentleman to tell these irate junior officers that he felt it was his obligation to honour the word given by Raheel Sharif to Nawaz Sharif. But the fact that it was Raheel Sharif who had bailed out Nawaz Sharif and company in the Dawn leaks case did not remain buried for long. And with this Raheel lost a lot in terms of credibility, as he well ought to have.
Gone was the image of the great commander standing guard duty over the interests of his country, and a much reduced man emerged.
And Raheel did himself no service when he allowed Lahore’s military dairy farm land to be sliced up, and allotted to a number of generals, himself included. And then four squares of the most expensive agricultural land ever allotted to any general, somehow got allotted to him. Reportedly Raheel had already exercised the option of applying for agricultural land as a Maj Gen and was allotted 50 acres. He could not have revisited this option again, but did so as General under which rank his allocation became 100 acres.
And the Adjutant General making these very profitable allotments, the most despised senior officer of the day, saw himself being elevated as Secretary of Defense, largely as a “thank you” from Raheel Sharif.
But it was Raheel Sharif’s acceptance of the command in Saudi Arabia which really burst his bubble, and what was left of him, was not very pretty to behold.
There are rumours that this new activity to boost Raheel’s image was undertaken to dress him up for the Presidency, or as interim Prime Minister before the next elections.
However that be, and his supporters are welcome to do their best to give a fresh boost to Raheel’s image, but my advice to them would be not to do so invoking the image of Kiyani as a foil. Professionally, compared to Kiyani, Raheel was a midget, but morally the midget was Kiyani.