There is a lot of debate on whether or not Pakistan should launch an anti-militant operation in North Waziristan; and whether U.S drone strikes should be allowed to continue against targets in Pakistan.
These two issues should not be conflated. The North Waziristan issue has to do with the security goals of the NATO alliance and Karzai government. And these do not coincide with Pakistan’s national security concerns or perceptions. Not only is there a divergence between contending perceptions of the U.S and Pakistan, but they are in part mutually contradictory. The issue of drone strikes and how they impact Pakistani security, on the other hand is of immediate concern to Pakistan, but not so much for the NATO alliance. The interests of the two sides coincide on this issue only when the targets taken out are common adversaries. And they coincide to this extent only. But such coincidences of interest seldom appears to be the case.
Pakistan would be quite happy to see TTP cohorts blown up, but suspects that there is not too much enthusiasm on the part of the U.S to target these elements, because, it is believed, that many of these are assets of the Afghan intelligence.
For some time now, it is also believed that Indian intelligence is involved with them as well, while U.S treats TTP operations with benign neglect. [This belief has risen sharply among in the ranks of Pakistan army after NATO strikes massacred Pakistani soldiers at a border post last year.] U.S drone strikes therefore end up killing either innocent civilians, or members of militant factions who are anti-TTP, but who have done nothing to undermine the security of the Pakistani state. Thus, Pakistan would not like to see them attacked for fear of enlarging the circle of Pakistan’s enemies, especially when its resources and capacity to fight the militancy is already stretched to the limit.
But how did a situation come about where the U.S and Pakistan are allies, but the allies of each of them are the adversaries of the other?
To understand the distillation of this brew, one would have to go back to the period of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when Ahmad Shah Masud and Gulbadin Hikmatyar were vying for the position of top dog among factions leading the Afghan resistance. Instead of treating all the factions equitably, Zia decided in favour of Hikmatyar primarily because he endorsed the brand of Islam practiced [or preached??] by the latter. Masud was miffed but not yet left out in the cold. But when the Taliban arose and swiftly swept away the warlords, General Babar used his considerable credibility and influence with the Pakistani establishment, to switch its support from Hikmatyar to Mullah Omar. The forces of the latter [the Taliban] overcame all their adversaries, except a little corner of Afghanistan in the Northeast of the country where Ahmad Shah Masud’s Northern Alliance held out against them. Pakistan’s open espousal of the Taliban pushed Masud into an equally open anti-Pakistan position, with reliance on India as a backer.
When the U.S invaded Afghanistan, it [ostensibly] did so to destroy al Qaida, and to remove theTaliban from power as a punishment for extending hospitality and refuge to bin Laden. The natural ally of the U.S in this operation was Ahmad Shah Masud’s Northern Alliance, the inveterate enemy of the Taliban. Thus came about the situation where the most important regional ally of the U.S, in its war against Afghanistan, was Pakistan; but the prime ally of the U.S within Afghanistan was the Northern Alliance, which had an avowedly adversarial relationship to Pakistan, and one of declared friendship with Pakistan’s arch-rival in the region i.e India!
This maze of conflicted relationships could never work. And much as the U.S establishment would like to accuse Pakistan of a double cross, it was the U.S choice of its partner in Afghanistan which had a double cross built into it right from the very beginning. Pakistan’s policies are a mere response to this American misstep, which put Pakistan’s security interests not just at variance with American-Karzai government interests, but often in opposition to them.
The U.S should have been fully cognizant of Pakistan’s relationship with the Northern Alliance, and the consequences of partnering them in their Afghanistan venture. And being cognizant of it they ought to have paid due heed to it. Not doing so was either due to incompetence, or sheer disregard which follows in the wake of hubris. But it was Pakistan’s obligation as well to voice its misgivings. I am not aware that Pakistan did so. Probably Musharraf was in deep shock over Richard Armitage’s promise of bombing Pakistan to the stone age; or alternately, having quickly surrendered, and recovered, he was too overcome by the excitement of having made it to the list of George Bush’s best friends. In either case, his brain was not functioning, if indeed it ever did! Had Musharraf counted to ten before disintegrating, he would have realized that bombing a nuclear state with impunity needs more than mere bluster. Such realization would have allowed him to negotiate the terms of Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S, to the benefit of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. He could have pushed the case for King Zahir Shah to be the Afghan head of state, empowered by the support of the international community. The King was an adversary whom Pakistan knew well and could deal with. He was also the man most qualified to bring unity to Afghanistan, and one least expected to impoverish it further. Unless the U.S had an agenda different to the one they announced, these are exactly the two qualities they should have been looking for in a man who would lead a post-pulverized Afghanistan.
When the U.S bombing of Afghanistan began, there was a fair body of opinion in Pakistan whose view was the Mullah Omar and Osama were finally getting their comeuppance, and deserved what they were getting. But gradually as the sheer scale of the operation, which was instigated by 911 began to become clear, a doubt started to creep in i.e. was Osama really capable of pulling off something as sophisticated as 911? And as the U.S started to build its case for its war on Iraq, this doubt grew apace, because each building block of this case was clearly seen to be the lie that it was. And progressively with this, the credibility of the U.S justification for the invasion of Afghanistan was undermined.
And when the U.S attack on Iraq finally materialized, U.S credibility went through the floor. Whether it was the literate Pakistani, or the unlettered one, the conclusion of the huge majority was that U.S policy was driven by enmity against Islam. And nothing that the U.S has done after that, or facilitated by its acquiescence, has altered this perception. Indeed, Lebanon, Gaza, the Marvi Marmara, Libya etc. have only strengthened it.
Meanwhile fresh evidence continued to surface in connection with the U.S invasion of Afghanistan, which continually undermined its moral and legal justification, even among the so-called educated and “westernized” elite, which so baffles people in the West.
Afghanistan was ostensibly attacked because Osama had attacked the U.S, and Mullah Omar, in the very least, had facilitated him. But it turns out that there is no evidence for either assertion. Given Osama’s oft repeated aims and objectives, 911 should have been his landmark achievement. He ought to have claimed it, even if he had nothing to do with it. Yet his immediate reaction was outright denial of any involvement in It! One journalist or the other has claimed that later, Osama owned 911 in conversation with them while disowning his earlier stance. But this could as easily have been a case of second thoughts–of claiming what was left unclaimed.
On the other issue i.e. of Mullah Omar’s complicity with Osama, all credible evidence points to the fact that prior to 911 Mullah Omar warned Osama not to use Afghan territory to project war abroad, and especially not to do so against America. In order to further restrict Osama’s freedom of action and to keep a closer eye on him, he had Osama moved from Jalalabad to Kandahar where he ordered his free access to foreign media blocked. And when, in the wake of 911, the U.S demanded that Osama be handed over to them for trial, Omar promised to do the needful, if the U.S provided him prima facie evidence of Osama’s guilt. He was not only within his rights to ask for this evidence, as the head of a sovereign state, he was obliged to do so. And he made this offer more than once.
But the U.S did not come up with any evidence against Osama. They did not have any. They did not even have evidence against Osama for him to make it to the FBI’s “most wanted” list. And from 911 to the time that they killed him, despite years of torture and water boarding of hundreds of al Qaida affiliated captives, they could not unearth any evidence against him. The only evidence against him was what the U.S media said about him, giving the lead for much of the international media to follow. Osama’s name as the prime suspect for 911 showed up at one of the U.S TV channels thirty-three minutes after the strike on the second tower. The accusation against him then became a trickle, but within hours it became a flood which would brainwash the American people. By this time there can be little doubt that this was stage managed by agencies of the U.S government. What stood for evidence against Osama therefore was nothing more than accusations and asservations in the U.S media. And this “evidence” was strengthened by repetition by droves of “experts” who obliged by coming out of the wood works to drive these charges into American minds.
But notwithstanding all the above, the U.S nevertheless launched its longest war on Afghanistan–the poorest country in the world, and one already shattered by war and years of strife, whose only sin was that despite all its poverty it retained its pride and offended against the majesty of the U.S by not accepting its dictates. Based on the discredited justification for the invasion of Afghanistan, this war is clearly a high crime in international law, and all counties participating in it, including Pakistan can safely be dubbed international criminals.
Given all of the foregoing, when it is considered that there are also more than fair grounds to suspect that the war on Afghanistan was planned BEFORE 911, American credibility could only find itself in serious doldrums. A tiny minority given to delving into alternate media came to this conclusion through study. Most got there because of conclusions drawn from the U.S justifications advanced for the attack on Iraq, which proved to be shoddy in the very least.
At all events that is where overwhelming Pakistani opinion stands with regard to the U.S and the war in Afghanistan. And when it stands there, it also condemns Pakistan’s role in this war as a criminal off-shoot of America’s effort. This is the reason why the people Pakistan do not want Pakistan to take any further part in this war; why they say that Pakistan is fighting America’s war, even when it is fighting against out-and-out cut-throats like the TTP; and this is why they do not protest many of TTP’s atrocities as loudly as they should–they feel that any such condemnation may be misconstrued as being pro-American. That America is so hated is not because Pakistanis are plain mad. It is because America has worked very hard to get there.
So much for public opinion and how it got built up, and why it took the direction that it did. And make no mistake, opinion among the soldiers and officers of the armed forces of Pakistan is congruent with the opinion on the Pakistani street. However, knowledge of certain occurrences, discussions, debates, and speculations arising therefrom, went a considerable distance to reinforce suspicions about the ultimate American motives driving the war in Afghanistan. The following come to mind:
- Very early on when the Pakistan army was deployed in the tribal areas, it was not uncommon among some young officers, to complain that it seemed to be U.S policy not to target Abdullah Mehsud. The grounds for this suspicion were complaints of officers who had more than once relayed coordinates of Mehsud’s position to the Americans, but the requested strikes never came. Given that the U.S seemed to believe in use of excessive force, their hesitation to target Abdullah Mehsud seemed incongruent with their stated aims and policy. This could only raise suspicions among Pakistanis.
- Very early in their operations against the TTP suspicions started to grow that the insurgents were receiving assistance from across the Afghan border, and that both the Afghan and Indian intelligence were complicit in this, while it was assumed that the U.S was acquiescent. With the passage of time this suspicion has graduated to belief, and then to firm conviction.
- Then there was the issue of massive numbers of requests for Pakistani visas by U.S personnel of varied calling, but all suspected of having to do with one or the other aspect of intelligence work. Among other offices, visa requests in this category had to be passed through the Joint Chiefs Secretariat. Gen Tariq Majeed was the boss of this headquarters at the time, and he made it more than clear that he did not view such visa requests with favour. Quite plainly he was suspicious of them. I do not know whether he had taken Kiyani into confidence, but he ordered that process on all such visa requests, except those that were patently genuine, be stopped. After some tug of war with the government, his office was cut out of the visa processing loop, and the matter was handled directly between Zardari/Gillani, Rehman Malik, and Hussain Haqqani. Thus, we had a situation that the army [ which was ultimately responsible for national security,] wanted the influx of large numbers of Americans into the country blocked because of security considerations, while the President, his government, and his ambassador in Washington were busy undermining the primary security establishment of their country, opening Pakistan up to foreign spies, agents, and operatives in unprecedented numbers! It was already widely suspected that Zardari and company were taking their orders from foreign masters. After this, no doubt about this was left. How Kiyani could have given preference to inertness over action in the face of such overt betrayal of his country’s vital security interests, when his army was in the field fighting for Pakistan’s life, only God knows. But everyone else would know that this was highly demoralizing for his officers, who were beginning to strongly resent America’s interference in Pakistan’s affairs. Kayani became suspect because of this, and his nexus with Zardari got reconfirmed.
- Then came Abdul Malik Rigi on the scene in Baluchistan, fighting for the independence of Iranian Baluchistan. Those who had read Seymour Hersh’s article to the effect that allocation of 400 million dollars for destabilizing Iran had already been made by the U.S government, immediately recognized Rigi for the CIA asset that he was. This was no surprise, but what was surprising was, that the U.S government was unmindful of the fact that any such movement in Iranian Baluchistan would definitely spill over into Pakistani Baluchistan; or did the U.S not care? By natural progression along these lines the next question obviously had to be, whether the U.S did not mind this fire engulfing Pakistan, and perhaps even willed it so? Such speculations among Pakistan army officers could not have done anything to stem suspicions about the ultimate aims of the U.S in our region.
Keeping all of the foregoing in mind, one would be in a far better position to decide whether or not Pakistan should extend its operations into North Waziristan, as it is being goaded to do by the U.S, by U.S assets in Pakistan, and by those Pakistanis who are congenitally deficient, or chronic traitors to the larger interest of their country. Pakistan MUST resist falling prey to exhortations which will lead to actions which are clearly against its fundamental national interests.
It must sternly desist from extending military operations into North Waziristan. It must do this for the following reasons:
- The war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S in this war is highly unpopular with both the people of Pakistan, and its armed forces. The army is already stretched to the limit. Beyond this limit it will break, as all armies do sooner or later when fighting irregular wars, because they are not designed for such wars.
- Operational overstretch is bad enough, and sustained overstretch is worse. But when it is sustained operational overstretch in a highly unpopular cause, it will give rise to mutiny in the ranks. In Pakistan’s current throes this will be an existential catastrophe for us.
- Irrespective of all else, extension of operations into North Waziristan will enlarge the circle of our enemies manifold. If the U.S, with all its resources and with an international coalition behind it, has not been able to beat back a determined insurgency, and has been forced [in principle] to accept negotiations with its adversary as the only way out, what makes the supporters of extension of operations into North Waziristan believe that the results of this war will be any different to the American effort in Afghanistan? If we have to create a new adversary, fight a long war with it, only to eventually come to the negotiating table to end the conflict, would we not be better off not starting the conflict in the first place? There is a strong possibility that operations in Waziristan will suck in and spread militant unrest and terrorism into the rest of Pakistan. And even a clear victory in Waziristan will be worthless unless we have the tools to deploy there, which will bring about good governance in the wake of such a victory.
- Pakistan badly needs there to be a strong pro-Pakistan element in the next government in Kabul. At the very least we need pro-Pakistan administrations in the Afghan provinces on our borders. We will need their assistance to seal our borders against help coming to TTP from the Afghan side of the border. Without this, defeating the TTP will be twice as difficult. We therefore cannot afford to gratuitously convert the Haqqanis into our enemies. There is no element of a double cross in our relationship with the Haqqanis. It is Pakistan who was double crossed when first we were blackmailed and railroaded into a manifestly illegal and criminal war against a country innocent of all wrong-doing; and we were double crossed yet again when our alliance with the U.S was extended to include an alliance with the present government of Afghanistan which was, and is, hostile and inimical to interests of both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
If despite all of the above, Zardari will do the American bidding and extend the war into North Waziristan, the army should agree to do this on the sole condition that Zardari and all journalists and others advocating this course of action, shall form the first line of attack, so that at least some good comes from this round of bloodletting.