In 1970, as the Yahya Khan junta was considering elections in order to do democracy a favour, it was known that they would best like election results that promised a split mandate and a squabbling parliament. This was needed if the army was to retain its position of primacy at the top of the pyramid of power, which it had always held.
So, when the ISI was asked to give it analyses, it dutifully served up the conclusion which the generals most wanted i.e that if the elections were to be completely fair, a fractured mandate would be the result.
This was a cause of great elation among the high command. This meant that a few drunken generals would be in a position to play one faction against the other, thus retaining real power themselves. And as a bonus they would also earn a moniker of honesty.
And so, elections were held which were fair and honest, driven entirely by dishonest intent. To the great shock of the generals, the electorate was not half as drunk as themselves. It gave a stunning mandate to Mujib in East Pakistan, and a majority to Bhutto in the West.
But this mandate could not be honoured. For if it was, the colony would overnight become the colonizer and vice versa. So, Bhutto and the generals decided to forestall this eventuality, and fell back on their favourite tactic to nullify this result. They opted to deny power to Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman and resorted to a “crack down” on his party and supporters on March 25, 1971.
The collective genius of the high command had concluded that this would cower the Bengalis sufficiently so that they would not dare raise their heads again for the next hundred years.
But the Bengalis did not cooperate. They began to raise their heads sufficiently to be able to fight back. And the generals had no plan B to meet this contingency, except to crack down even harder.
And as the present shows, this is one thing they are very happy doing, and it remains their one solution to meet every situation.
But in 1971 this sucked in the Indian army. The crackdown went in a straight line to civil war, conventional battles, defeat, surrender, and the end of Pakistan.
But this should have been known to the generals. And it surely was. General Sahibzada Yakub Khan preferred to resign rather than opt for the crackdown. And later, as Gen Tikka Khan was to be replaced, a number of senior generals REFUSED to take over from him. They knew what was coming but refused to say this aloud, except to refuse their posting to East Pakistan, and so, to save their skins.
East Pakistan was always the choicest command for a general. So obviously, for it to be refused, there must have been good reason. And that was, that they could all see ultimate defeat looming in the distance.
And though they could see it, they did not register objections against a course of action the initiation of which would lead to it. Cowardice obviously subdued moral courage. One result of this train of events was what came to be known as The Attock Conspiracy. This involved mainly younger officers who were committed to holding to account all those who led us to a war of choice in which defeat was certain. They wanted all officers of the rank of maj gen and above to be tried. Those among the latter who could not advance proof that they had objected to the course of action by the high command which led to the 1971 catastrophe were to be held guilty of dereliction of moral duty and dismissed from service. And those found guilty of planning and executing operation “crack down” which could only lead to ultimate defeat, were to be considered fit to face the firing squad. Indeed, if the generals found themselves deserving of the privileges, they had voted themselves, they were also fully deserving of bearing the consequences of their failure and ineptitude.
But before this debate among the officers involved in this conspiracy could reach a definitive conclusion, the conspiracy was exposed, and they were arrested, tried, and sentenced to various jail terms. The passion with which they loathed the generals is fairly reflected in the following paragraph from the statement to the Court by one of the under trial officers:
“When the war became imminent, I took leave from the PMA and joined my unit, with thanks to the CO who requisitioned my services. The next day the war started. But instead of glory, I found only disillusionment. The truth was that we were a defeated army even before a shot was fired. This was a very bitter truth. With each corpse that I saw, my revulsion increased for the men who had signed the death warrants of so many very fine men. Yes, fine men, but poor soldiers, who were never given the chance to fight back, because they were not trained to fight back. When they should have been training for war, they were performing the role of labourers, farmers or herdsmen, anything but the role of soldiers. This was not ‘shahadat.’ This was cold-blooded murder. Who was responsible for this? I was responsible! But more than me someone else was responsible. Peoplewhogetpaidmorethanmewereresponsible.Whatweresomeofthesemen,these callous, inhuman degenerates, doing when their only job was to prepare this army for war? Were these men not grabbing lands and building houses? Did it not appear in foreign magazines that some of them were pimping for their bloated grandmaster? Yes, generals,wearingthatuniform(pointingatMajGenZiaulHaq, thecourt’spresident) pimping and whore-mongering!”
Today the feelings of the rank and file against the high command are no less virulent, because Pakistan is in the same predicament as it was in 1971. The differences are that in 1971 the high command opted for elections under a false assumption which guaranteed their power; today they are denying elections which clearly portend a result which will break their hold on power. In 1971 the high command was marked by inebriation, incompetence, and cowardice; today they are driven by hypocrisy and the fear of consequences of treason, should they be pushed off the tiger they are riding. And they are no less cowardly, incompetent, and complicit. In 1971 their genius led to the breakup of Pakistan. Today it threatens to destroy that bit of Pakistan we still have left to us.
But unlike 1971, out of nowhere in July 2023, came a shaft of light to pierce the cloud of doom in the form of Judge Farrukh Farid who signaled his intent to remain unafraid of the high command by virtue of a simple order issued by him. He was followed by Justice Babar Sattar and his orders taking senior officers of the police and district administration to task for gross irregularities in the execution of their duty. And he was followed by Justices Amjad Rafique and Mirza Waqqas Rauf of the Lahore High Court. And now comes Justice Ibrahim Khan of the Peshawar High Court to show what a Chief Justice should be and can be.
At this stage if just a few more judges decided that instead of shuddering and grovelling at the feet of the high command, they will instead stand for the cause of Pakistan and the rights of its people, they shall strip the high command of the cover of the servile officers of the police and district administrations whom it is using for terrorizing the people and extending its grip on the state. If the high command has deigned to take notice of the changing pulse in KPK, they would know that a push back against the inequities perpetrated by them has already begun in that province.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this stand by the judges will leave only two options open to the high command. They shall either be forced to retreat to the barracks, or step in with the imposition of a full-fledged martial law. Compared to the middle postion which the all-powerful eunuchs used to hold in court or the harem, even this should be acceptable to us. For this would put the high command astride a tiger which they would not long be able to ride.
And the one man in Pakistan whose choice of sides taken will impact our joint fate as a people more crucially than all the rest is Qazi Faiz Isa. It is seldom in history that one man can outweigh an entire army. In our history that time is now. But the window of opportunity is a narrow one indeed. For as the crowds of the hungry swell up with ever greater hopelessness propelling them, sooner or later the army will have to confront them on the streets. And after the first blood has been drawn Pakistan will have entered a new phase of misfortune. And this fire once lit, not all the speeches delivered to Apex Committees by the apex genius of our high command will be able to douse.
If the venerable Qazi Sahib thus chooses to bestir himself before such an eventuality comes to pass, and stands by the state and the rights of its people, he shall have put himself up as the leading contender for being acknowledged as the greatest hero of our age.
Yet hopes dim as one follows the progress of the case regarding the S.C Practice and Procedure Act being heard by Qazi Sahib. It is very difficult to evade the feeling that he is straining to convince us that a constitutional provision can be amended by an act of parliament. Even lay people can see through his effort, and that this is being mounted specifically to allow Nawaz Sharif to mount us once again. This is showing up why he took the position which he did with regard to the Hudaibya case. And the smell that is issuing forth is offensive. Perhaps it could be too much to expect that the stature of a man can be stretched, who is intrinsically small.
That a day would have come when judges, who have through decades smoothened the path of the high command to subject us to misrule, would of a sudden become the focus of our hopes, is by itself half a miracle already. The task which they now have to conclude is what a few judges have begun, and to complete this miracle.