The other day I heard Gen Hamid Gul on a talk show give out his take on a fundamental problem with Nawaz Sharif’s psyche. He said he had spent hours with the late lamented Abba- jee [Nawaz Sharif’s dad], Nawaz, and Shahbaz, over many sittings, trying to urge them to desist from the compulsion of expecting the army senior command to grovel at their feet, as the the police and the bureaucracy had been reduced into doing. He lamented the fact that he could not get this advice through their heads.
That indeed seems to be where the problem between the Sharifs and the army begins. Though in the present instance there was the bitterness of the Musharraf strand to it as well.
Nawaz and company did not find it in themselves to overlook the humiliation they suffered at Musharraf’s hands and were committed to return this with interest. A few among the senior ranks in the army were moved by their loyalty to Musharraf. But my reading was that a majority were not so moved and held Musharraf personally guilty of having used power derived from the army to further his own ends and perpetuate his rule, without fulfilling his vows to the nation, and often indeed putting his interests above those of the country. The NRO was the most shameful and egregious example of this.
However, when the Nawaz government started with proceedings against Musharraf on the basis of his action in 2007, instead of Oct 1999, the fact that their motivation for doing so was naught else but revenge, pure and simple, was clear for all to see. Musharraf’s overthrow of the Nawaz government in 1999 had to be avoided because going there would have opened another can of worms i.e. the events which compelled him to overthrow Nawaz Sharif which if agitated again would have been a cause of acute legal embarrassment to Nawaz and to the judges who had validated Musharraf’s takeover. Thus, it became quickly apparent that Nawaz Sharif’s legal recourse against Musharraf was driven by little more than a thirst for vengeance. Almost immediately therefore, the opinion within the army started to shift in support of Musharraf.
Thus it seems, whether moved by personal loyalty, or by palpable vengeance against Musharraf, the opinion against a Musharraf trial coalesced within the senior ranks in the army. But whatever be the motivating factor, there was a widespread feeling that the army had its hands full without the Musharraf distraction, which the current situation in the country should have counseled against.
In the junior ranks of the army there seemed to be considerable resentment against the Nawaz government. This arose primarily from the almost daily castigation of the army on various TV channels, where excoriating Musharraf became a popular pass time, with each channel trying to best the other. In their enthusiasm, all too frequently, many of the interlocutors in these talks jumped over from Gen Musharraf to the generality of the army as a whole. The junior ranks saw in this unchecked criticism of the army a collusion between the media and the government. Not stopping this onslaught, when the government had the power to do so, was seen as proof of government involvement. In a situation where these junior ranks were daily victims of terrorist assaults, this was a perception not likely to endear the government to them. And those who constituted this government had so much lard congealed on their pitiful brains, that they could not see this, because, beyond arrogance little could reside in their upper chambers.
And Nawaz Sharif’s well merited reputation for corruption could not have helped matters much.
This situation which was boiling at the sub-surface really came to the fore when the army Chief was questioned about it while addressing the SSG. The General tried to calm their misgivings by assuring them that nothing would be allowed to lower the prestige of the army, or words to this effect. Any general, in any army of the world, would have been expected to say exactly this.
But those surrounding Nawaz Sharif were so far gone in their hubris that they took this as a threat from the army and, frothing at their mouths, came out with a flood of counter threats. With this they hoped to cow the army down!
On the heels of this came the Geo incident when Hamid Mir survived an apparent attempt on his life, and the PM, ever solicitous of the cause of journalism, went over to see Hamid Mir, and prayed for his full recovery, and exhorted him, that he should again spread the word of truth as he had always done, after he was back in the saddle. This moved the suspicion of the government being complicit in running down the army, from conjecture to certainty.
Most of us who have access to the TV already had cause to suspect that this government was in cahoots with some of the terrorist groups in the Punjab, and that it was giving sanctuary and succour to such groups. If we, as uninitiated citizens, had grounds to suspect this, it is more than probable that the intelligence agencies would have much more material on this unholy collusion. It is therefore reasonable to expect then, that the army was deeply uncomfortable with, and suspicious of, the government for opposing the launching of an operation against the militants who had over a period, killed tens of its officers and men. And it is a significant fact that when eventually it was forced to launch this operation, it did so on its own, without sanction from the government.
And to cap all of the above, when Nawaz Sharif went to India, he did so to cement a business deal. And to facilitate this deal, he promised his Indian partners a change in Pakistan’s Afghan policy!
Meanwhile, things between the army and the government came to a head over the issue of the Musharraf deal. In short, Shahbaz Sharif and Chaudhary Nisar had promised the army chief on behalf of Nawaz that Musharraf would be let free if he presented himself for indictment in the court. This was Nawaz Sharif’s commitment, not to the army chief, but to the army high command as whole. But no sooner than Musharraf was prevailed upon to do the needful, Nawaz Sharif went back on his word. This was a slap on the face of the army and brought the junior ranks and the generals on the same page as far as their love of the government was concerned.
Imran was not directly involved in any of this. He came to distrust the government totally, from a different route. When he asked for a recount of votes on four seats, which was his legal right, it seems he was reasonably certain that this won’t be resisted. But it now seems that it was to be resisted with all the might of the government because these four seats would have opened a pandora’s box, to expose massive rigging. This would have damaged the legitimacy of the government.
The more this was resisted, the more the suspicions of Imran seem to have been inflamed. As he went knocking on different doors, so did different people come out to explain to him the sheer extent of the electoral fraud that had taken place.
This fraud is now generally known to and accepted by most. The constitutional amendments regarding elections would ordinarily not matter, but in view of the sinister alliance between PML-N and PPP, they have a very ominous import. In a nutshell they go to ensure that these two parties will hold this country hostage and that no election can change this, because mechanisms are in place to rig any election, to any extent, by the party in power. The only force which had a chance at throwing a frail challenge to this system was the main opposition party. But this possibility is nullified when opposition has been made “friendly”. It is thus that you have a worried Zardari come here all the way from Dubai to save the “system”. It should be obvious to anyone that he is after his next 5-year turn at the till–that is, should there be anything left in the till by then!
I feel this is what has motivated Imran to launch the movement which he has. Was the army with him before he started out? Ony God, the Chief, and Imran would know. Has the army now turned over to Imran’s cause? Again, I don’t know, but I certainly hope it has.
The “system” must be overturned. But the army must not rule. An interim set-up should hold new elections, which should be above-board and fair. Does the constitution allow this? NO. But when the army, for the first time in its existence, moves, not for political power but for the supreme national interest, the constitution, the courts and above all, the people, will be forgiving.