–The U.S went into Afghanistan after 911 for the following objectives.
- As sole hegemon it HAD to flex its muscles. It could not take 911 lying down. Revenge had to be taken without taking its name.
- It wanted to restart the “Turkmenistan pipeline.”
- After the defeat and departure of the USSR, and its own withdrawal from the area, new areal mapping techniques discovered significant mineral wealth in Afghanistan.
- But most important of all, it very early decided to stay on in Afghanistan, to physically contain China, and to be in a central position to affect events in the rest of central Asia.
–Using the India card in Afghanistan was decided by the U.S very early, when it put Karzai, a confirmed CIA agent and pro-India hawk, at the helm there.
–If there was any doubt about where the U.S stood on this issue, it was removed by the proliferation of Indian Consulates in Afghanistan.
–Pakistan could not allow this for obvious reasons, and so it had little choice but to assist the Taliban to counter the Karzai-India axis, which the U.S was facilitating.
–The U.S lost the war in Afghanistan because it failed to win it. Imperial overstretch resulted in its exhaustion which led to this situation and its withdrawal. It had to blame somebody for this, and this had to be Pakistan. It could not come to admit that without Pakistan on its side, they could not have won this war. And it further could not admit, that by double crossing Pakistan by putting Karzai in power in Kabul, Pakistan could scarcely be expected to assist it in its [Pakistan’s] own encirclement by India.
–There was utter confusion in U.S strategy because its stated aims for war in Afghanistan [as declared to its people], were at total variance to its real aims [which were confidential].
Whereas the stated aims were [interchangeably] to bring democracy to the country, improve the lot of women there, and bring peace to the war ravaged country and rebuild it; the real aims were to build the pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea, to sit on the mineral wealth of the country, and most importantly, to have a physical military presence in Afghanistan, to facilitate the encirclement of China, and have additional options vis a vis Central Asia.
–The neocon influence plus the pride of the Pentagon did not allow the U.S to affect a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, which would have been an acknowledgement of defeat.
–With the coming to power of Trump in the U.S, the following has happened:
- The U.S government policies are being dictated entirely by ideology, a central pillar of which is anti-muslim.
- The people pushing this ideology are virulent neocons.
- Trump [though opposed in general to war] having promised much and delivered next to nothing, with the U.S credibility stock in the world plummeting, has little left to redeem himself with except war in certain designated areas. Thus, attention is now focused on both Pakistan and N. Korea–both allies of China.
–In this milieu the U.S finds India, another [newly] ideological state driven by a nationalism, which is primarily actuated by anti-Muslim and anti-Chinese animus.
–And in this, India too there has a government that had promised much, and has failed to deliver as spectacularly–indeed, apart from insinuating itself into a position of subservience to the U.S, it has little to show for itself. Modi too must therefore redeem himself by war. And thus there is a confluence of interest between the U.S and India. Building CPEC was not an issue when the U.S initially invaded Afghanistan, but is now an issue of burning importance for both the U.S and India, who are committed to see it sabotaged.
–Pakistan, for whom CPEC is of even more importance than it is for China, is in its most fragile state. For ten years it has had governments which have been committed only to looting and hollowing out the state. The army, which could have used its considerable heft to stop this plunder failed to see in this heartless looting of the state, the most cogent threat to national security. It failed to do so, not because it did not have eyes to see what was happening, but because it lacked the courage to acknowledge it for what it was.
–McCain’s recent visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan had as much to do with crafting a new alignment for further U.S effort in Afghanistan, as it had to do with trying to save Nawaz Sharif’s skin. The U.S would want a U.S ally at the helm in Pakistan. None would suit U.S aims in the region better than Nawaz Sharif or Zardari, two rogues so besotted with personal aggrandizement, that they wouldn’t refrain from snatching the last morsel of food from a starving population, and stash the money abroad. The threat that their loot, towards the accumulation of which they have brought their country to its very knees, could be impounded by the U.S, could make them barter away national interest. If the army has not been able to see this over the last ten years, I can only say that our generals have the faculty of seeing just one thing at a time, and for the last decade what their eyes have been fixed on is the greens of the golf courses and their steadily increasing entitlements.
–If Pakistan has to survive the double envelopment by India and the U.S, it has no option left but aligning itself firmly behind China, such that China has a stake in Pakistan for which it will make a stand for Pakistan. I have little doubt that this will make our country a serf of China, but this will at least allow Pakistan to survive whole. And this alignment behind China must be done without loss of time. This is absolutely vital. But Pakistan has no government and has not had one for quite some time now. None can fill this vacuum but our army. For once, it should feel that it should be moved by the highest national interest without resort to martial law. And this can be done. But as the last resort, the army should do whatever it takes to save the state. For as the Romans said, in a state the highest value is the state itself; and when the state is threatened, all laws should be held in abeyance.